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A. Introduction 
There have been a number of significant oil and gas decisions this past 
year, although there were fewer decisions in the spring and summer of 2020 
due to the covid-19 pandemic. In Briggs v. Southwestern Energy 
Production Co., the year’s most prominent case, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that the traditional “rule of capture” applies to horizontal 
unconventional oil and gas wells. In SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well 
Energy, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that abandonment of a 
leasehold negated retained acreage provisions in a lease, permitting 
conversion claims against lessee for oil removed from storage tanks. In 
another case, Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., the Superior Court held that a 
lessor’s ratification of lease waived any prior defects in lessee’s 
performance under the lease. The Commonwealth Court upheld a zoning 
plan that permitted oil and gas development in rural low-density residential 
districts against a challenge under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s 
Environmental Rights Amendment (Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning 
Hearing Bd.). The Commonwealth Court also rejected late fees and 
penalties imposed on an oil and gas operator after the operator had 
challenged (Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Com. Of Pa. Public Utilities Comm’n). 
 With respect to federal courts, in UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent 
Easement for 1.7575 Acres, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals excluded 
expert testimony as to “stigma” damages in the condemnation of a gas 
pipeline that did not meet the standards under the Daubert case. A district 
court denied a lessor’s claims that a lessee breached the implied covenant to 
develop by failing to drill additional wells once two producing wells were 
drilled (Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC).  In another case, the district court 
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concluded that lessors raised an issue of fact whether lessees had conducted 
sufficient activities to hold leases under an operations clause (Butters v. 
SWN Prod. Co., LLC). In a third case, a district court held that an alleged 
agency relationship between a tax sale purchaser and the surface owner 
could preclude a “title wash” of unassessed oil and gas interests under the 
tax parcels (Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr.).  
 In B&R Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, the 
Environmental Hearing Board held the owner and operator of an oil and gas 
company personally liable under the participation theory for well plugging 
costs after the company was ordered to plug the well by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection, but only as to those costs that the 
company was able to pay at the time of the order. Lastly, on the regulatory 
front, the cost of an unconventional well permit was increased 150% to 
$12,500 per permit.   
B. Pennsylvania Supreme Court  
1. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020) 
● The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
Superior Court, holding that the rule of capture applied to 
unconventional, hydraulically fractured natural gas wells.  The 
Court remanded the decision to the lower court to consider if 
landowners sufficiently alleged a trespass claim based on a 
physical invasion of landowners’ tract.  
Plaintiff landowners, the Briggs, filed trespass and conversion claims in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County against Southwestern 
Energy Production Company (“Southwestern”), the operator of an 
unconventional natural gas well on an adjacent tract, alleging that 
Southwestern was extracting natural gas from under their undeveloped 
parcel.
1
 The Briggs did not expressly allege that Southwestern had caused a 
physical intrusion into their property.  Southwestern filed an answer 
denying that it had drilled under the Briggs’ land and pled a new matter 
alleging that the Briggs’ claim was barred by the rule of capture.
2
 At the 
end of discovery, Southwestern filed a motion for summary judgment. The 




                                                                                                             
 1. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334, 339 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020). 
 2. Id. at 340. 
 3. Id. at 340-341. 
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The Superior Court reversed the decision of the Court of Common 
Pleas.
4
 The Superior Court acknowledged that the Briggs did not allege a 
physical intrusion, but inconsistently characterized the issue as whether a 
trespass occurs when the defendant uses hydraulic fracturing in a manner 
“which extends into an adjoining landowner’s property and results in the 
withdrawal of natural gas from beneath that property[.]”
5
 The Superior 
Court held that hydraulic fracturing may give rise to trespass liability, 
particularly if subsurface fractures, fluid or proppants cross boundary lines.
6
  
The Superior Court reasoned that hydraulically fracturing is distinguishable 
from conventional drilling because (1) it uses artificial means to stimulate 
the flow of gas from shale formations; (2) the self-help remedy of drilling a 
neighboring well is unfeasible for small landowners due to the cost of 
unconventional wells; and (3) the rule of capture would permit an operator 
to drain an adjacent tract by drilling a well near a lease boundary.
7
 The 
Superior Court cited the dissent in the Texas Supreme Court case Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
8
 and a vacated West Virginia federal district 
court opinion in the case Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC.
9
 However, 
the record contained no evidence that Southwestern’s operations had 
resulted in a subsurface intrusion.  Therefore, the Superior Court remanded 
the case to the court of common pleas for additional factual development. 
The Supreme Court summarized the Superior Court’s analysis as follows: 
“first, that whenever ‘artificial means,’ such as hydraulic fracturing, are 
used to stimulate the flow of underground resources, the rule of capture 
does not apply because drainage does not occur through the operation of 
‘natural agencies,’ and second, that in this particular case summary 
judgment was premature in light of certain unspecified allegations relating 
to cross-boundary intrusions into Plaintiffs’ land.”
10
 
On appeal Southwestern framed the following issue for review: 
Does the rule of capture apply to oil and gas produced from 
wells that were completed using hydraulic fracturing and 
preclude trespass liability for allegedly draining oil or gas from 
under nearby property, where the well is drilled solely on and 
                                                                                                             
 4. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). 
 5. Briggs, 224 A.3d at 342 (quoting Briggs, 184 A.3d at 158) (emphasis in original).  
 6. Id. at 343. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 42 (Tex. 2008). 
 9. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 
(N.D.W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013). 
 10. Briggs, 224 A.3d at 343. 
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beneath the driller’s own property and the hydraulic fracturing 




The Supreme Court concluded that the parties did not disagree as to this 
question: they both responded in the affirmative.  However, the parties 
disagreed as to whether a physical intrusion took place, an issue that was 
not properly before the Supreme Court.
12
  The Supreme Court nonetheless 
decided it was proper to resolve the stated issue because the Superior Court 
opinion set forth a per se ruling foreclosing application of the rule of 
capture to hydraulically fractured wells.   
The Supreme Court first noted that the rule of capture traditionally 
applies even if the driller uses artificial methods to stimulate the flow of oil 
or gas; drilling itself constitutes an artificial stimulation method.
13
  There is 
no reason why the rule should apply any differently to hydraulic fracturing 
conducted solely on the driller’s property. The judiciary lacks institutional 




Furthermore, the present record did not support the Superior Court’s 
implicit assumption that drainage can only occur if there is a physical 
invasion of the neighboring property. The Supreme Court noted that 
drainage might occur without a physical intrusion: 
We cannot rule out, for example, that a fissure created through the 
injection of hydraulic fluid entirely within the developer’s property may 
create a sufficient pressure gradient to induce the drainage of hydrocarbons 
from the relevant stratum of rock underneath an adjacent parcel even absent 
physical intrusion. Nor can we discount the possibility that a fissure created 
within the developer’s property may communicate with other, pre-existing 
fissures that reach across property lines. Whether these, or any other non-
invasive means of drainage occasioned by hydraulic fracturing, are 




                                                                                                             
 11. Id (emphasis in original). 
 12. Id. at 346. 
 13. Id. at 348. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 349 (citing Brief for Amicus Prof. Terry Engelder, at 18 (indicating gas located 
in unconventional reservoirs exists within a network of cracks and fissures, and the gas may 
move across property lines when hydraulic fracturing “tap[s] into” that network)). 
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The Supreme Court held that expert evidence is required by the plaintiff 
to establish whether a physical intrusion occured.
16
  The Supreme Court 
declined to consider Southwestern’s argument that physical trespass 
concepts should be relaxed for activities that take place miles below the 
surface, because that argument was beyond the scope of the issue on 
appeal.
17
 The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and 
remanded the case to the Superior Court for reconsideration.
18
  
Justice Dougherty authored a concurring and dissenting opinion joined 
by Justice Donahue, which dissented from the majority as to the remand to 
the Superior Court and would instead remand to the trial court.
19
  The 
opinion also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs did 
not sufficiently allege a physical trespass.
20
 
C. Pennsylvania Superior Court  
1. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1258 
(August 13, 2019), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 229 A.3d 
570 
● Lessee abandoned leases by failing to produce oil and gas and 
removal and sale of oil in tanks after abandonment constituted 
conversion, as abandonment nullified retained acreage language 
in leases. 
Plaintiff landowners, SLT Holdings, LLC, (“SLT”), owned two tracts 
subject to decades-old leases that were currently held by lessee-operator, 
Mitch-Well Energy, Inc. (“Mitch-Well”).  SLT filed a complaint in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Warren County in 2013 seeking an injunction, 
declaratory judgment, an accounting, ejectment, conversion, and tortious 
interference with contract.
21
  In 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the injunction, declaratory judgment and conversion counts 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. (“Thus, to the extent this lawsuit goes forward on Plaintiffs’ new, physical-
intrusion theory, Plaintiffs will bear the burden of demonstrating that such an intrusion took 
place.”). 
 17. Id. at 350 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341, 347 
n.4, 633 A.2d 125, 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 5 n.3, 493 
A.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (1985)). 
 18. Id. at 351. 
 19. Id. at 353. 
 20. Id. at 353-354. 
 21. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1258, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2019). 
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which was granted by the trial court.  Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its 
remaining counts and Mitch-Well appealed.
22
 
The habendum clauses in the leases provided that that the primary term 
would be extended “for as long thereafter as oil or gas or other substances 
covered hereby are or can be produced in paying quantities….”  The leases 
also contained delay rental provisions, operations clauses and shut-in 
clauses.  The leases contained drilling commitment provisions that required 
lessee to drill multiple wells. If lessee failed to meet this requirement, the 
lease would terminate except as to twenty acres around each producing well 
already drilled (which was later amended to only five acres).
23
 One well 
was drilled on each lease in 1986 and no other well was drilled until Utica 
Resources, Inc., (lessee) under a new lease, drilled a well in 2011. The 
record established that no shut-in payments were tendered and no oil and 
gas were produced for twenty-five years.
24
 The Department of 
Environmental Protection records indicated the wells were deemed 
abandoned as early as 1990.
25
 
The trial court held that Mitch-Well had abandoned the leases by failing 
to develop the leases as required by the implied covenant to develop.
26
  The 
Superior Court affirmed the trial court.
27
  The Superior Court also rejected 
Mitch-Well’s argument that it had the right to remove the oil in the tanks 
under the retained acreage provision of the leases’ drilling commitment 
provisions. The Superior Court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that 




2. Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., No. 734 WDA 2019, --- A.3d ---, 2020 
WL 2313813 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 11, 2020) 
● Lessor’s ratification of lease and acceptance of royalty payments 
waived prior defects in performance 
The Superior Court held that an oil and gas lease that required the lessee 
to drill a well within 180-days or pay a delay rental did not terminate for 
failure to drill because the lessors expressly ratified the lease six and half 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. 
 23. Id at 1265. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1266. 
 26. Id. at 1266-1267 (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp. 332 F.Supp.2d 759 
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 A. 555 (1899)).  
 27. Id. at 1267. 
 28. Id. at 1268. 
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 Affirming the trial court, the Superior Court found that the 
lessors’ ratification of the leases and acceptance of royalty payments 
waived any prior defect.  
Lessors, Donald Wilson, Shirley Wilson, James Wilson, Marie Wilson 
and Lara S. Wilson Shields (“the Wilsons”), entered into a lease in 2003.
30
 
The lease provided that lessee, Snyder Brothers, Inc., had the right to drill a 
well within 180-days of the date of the lease or pay a delay rental to extend 
the term of the lease. Snyder Brothers paid delay rentals from 2003 to 
2010.
31
 In 2010, Snyder Brothers obtained a permit to drill a well and also 
obtained ratifications of the leases from the Wilsons and drilled a well 
before the end of 2010.
32
 Snyder Brothers unitized the well and paid 
royalties to all lessors included in the drilling unit.
33
  
Snyder Brothers assigned the leases to Winfield Resources, LLC 
(“Winfield”).
34
 Winfield then assigned an interest to PennEnergy 
Resources, LLC (“PennEnergy”).
35,36
 PennEnergy approached the Wilsons 
in 2017 to amend and ratify the previously amended lease from 2010.
37
 The 
Wilsons refused, stating that they believed the lease had already 
terminated.
38
 The Wilsons refused royalty payments since 2017.
39
 
The Wilsons filed a complaint in 2018 challenging the validity of the 
leases.
40
 The Wilsons alleged that the lease terminated due to the lessee’s 
failure to drill within 180-days.
41
 Relying on the Superior Court’s decision 
in Hite v. Falcon Partners,
42
 the Wilsons claimed that the lease could not be 
extended beyond the primary term through the indefinite payment of delay 
rentals.
43
 The Wilsons also argued that the lease terminated after Snyder 
Brothers drilled due to the well being impermissibly shut-in.
44
 
                                                                                                             
 29. Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., No. 734 WDA 2019, --- A.3d ---, 2020 WL 2313813 
(Pa. Super. Ct. May 11, 2020). 
 30. Id. at *1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *2. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Snyder Brothers, Winfield and PennEnergy, collectively, the “Lessees”. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at *3. 
 41. Id.  
 42. 13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
 43. Wilson, 2020 WL 2313813, at *3. 
 44. Id.  
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Lessees filed a demurrer for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted based on the Lessors’ delay rental argument.
45
 The 
Wilsons pled that they ratified the leases in 2010 and accepted royalty 
payments after drilling commenced. The Wilsons then waited seven years 
after ratifying the lease and after Snyder Brothers drilled on the property 
before challenging the validity.
46
 The trial court sustained the demurrer 




Lessees filed a preliminary objection that the claims related to 
impermissible shut-ins lacked sufficient specificity.
48
 The Wilsons alleged 
that the leases terminated due to impermissible “shut-in” periods. The 
pleading stated “[u]pon information and belief, the . . . Well has 
intermittently produced gas for approximately seven (7) years and has never 
continuously produced gas for any consecutive calendar year since 
production began in or around June 2011.”
49
 The Wilsons alleged that the 
breach occurred “at various times.”
50
 The trial court sustained the 
preliminary objection for lack of specificity and gave Lessors the 
opportunity to re-plead to provide specific dates of the shut-ins. Lessors did 
not take that opportunity.
51
 The trial court dismissed the complaint.  
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court. The ratification and 
acceptance of annual delay rental payments waived any potential prior 
defect presented by the payment of delay rentals.
52
 Hite had no effect on the 
facts before the court. In Hite, the Superior Court held that delay rental 
payments alone do not extend the primary term of an oil and gas lease if 
drilling had not begun.
53
 The Superior Court reasoned that allowing a lessee 
to pay delay rental and postpone development indefinitely is “inconsistent 
with the established rulings grounded in public policy.”
54
 Here, in contrast 
to Hite, the Wilsons ratified their original leases beyond the primary term 
and did not seek to void their amended leases until years after drilling had 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at *4. 
 49. Id. at *3.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at *4. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. (citing Hite, 13 A.3d at 948) (citations omitted). 
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 Under settled contract law, the Wilsons waived any claim 
they may have had to dispute the validity of the subject leases that accrued 
prior to the 2010 ratification in their amended agreements.
56
 
The Superior Court also affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
declaratory action for lack of specificity in the pleadings.
57
 The Wilsons did 
not identify “the length of the alleged shut-ins or why they believe they 
occurred; nor did they attempt to gather pre-complaint discovery as to those 
missing pieces of their allegations.”
58
 The Lessees were without enough 
information to adequately prepare a defense to the Wilson’s breach of 
contract claims.  
This case demonstrates the application of general contract principles to 
the relationship between lessee and lessor. Here, lessors, both expressly and 
through their actions, ratified the underlying lease. As such, the lessors 
waived defects in performance that might have occurred prior to the 
ratification. 
D. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
1. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Nov. 14, 2019) 
● Zoning ordinance allowing unconventional oil and gas 
development in low-density residential zoning district did not 
violative residents’ rights  
The Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court order denying a 
constitutional challenge to a local zoning ordinance that allowed 
unconventional oil and gas development in zoning districts with low-
density residential properties.
59
 Protect PT challenged the ordinance’s 
constitutionality on grounds that it violated the Township residents’ 
substantive due process rights and the Environmental Rights Amendment 
(“ERA”) in Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
60
 
Relying on its recent decisions in Frederick v. Allegheny Township Zoning 
Hearing Board 
61
 and Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Middlesex 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at *5.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Nov. 14, 2019). 
 60. Id.  
 61. 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (en banc). 
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Township Zoning Hearing Board,
62
 the Commonwealth Court upheld the 
trial court’s conclusion that the zoning ordinance did not violate either the 
substantive due process rights of the Township's residents or their rights 
under the ERA.  
 
The Penn Township Board of Commissioners enacted a zoning 
ordinance (“Ordinance”) that allowed oil and gas extraction in a zoning 
district called the “Rural Resource District,” which permitted low-density 
residential properties.
63
 The Ordinance described the purpose of the Rural 
Resource District as “providing land for continuing agricultural operations, 
resource management, timber harvesting, outdoor recreation, public and 
private conservation areas, low density single family residential, and 
compatible support uses.”
64
 The Ordinance established a Mineral Extraction 
Overlay (“MEO”) District that permitted unconventional natural gas 
development in the Rural Resource District.
65
 Protect PT challenged the 
constitutionality of the MEO District on grounds that it permits 
unconventional natural gas development in the Rural Resources District, 
arguing that unconventional natural gas development is a heavy industrial 
activity incompatible with residential use and the resident’s rights under the 
ERA. The Zoning Hearing Board did not schedule a public hearing on the 
challenge, deeming it denied under the Municipalities Planning Code.
66
   
The trial court held a four-day de novo trial on the challenge, ultimately 
finding that Protect PT did not carry its burden of establishing the invalidity 
of the Ordinance. Critical to its holding, the court noted that unconventional 
drilling is a special exception, subject to numerous standards “including 
general development standards in the [Ordinance] and particular standards 
pertaining to MEO District.”
67
 Under the Ordinance, the Zoning Hearing 
Board could impose additional conditions to promote the health and safety 
of the Township’s residents. Furthermore, the developer is required to 
“demonstrate that the drill site operations will not violate the [Township 
citizens’] right to clean air and pure water as set forth in the [ERA] through 
                                                                                                             
 62. No. 2609 C.D. 2015, 2019 WL 2605850 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 26, 2019). 
 63. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1177. 
 64. Id. at 1179. 
 65. Id.  1177. 
 66. Id. at 1178; see 53 P.S. § 10961.1(f)(1) (validity challenge deemed denied when the 
zoning hearing board fails to commence hearing within time limits). 
 67. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1179. 
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the submission of reports from ‘qualified environmental individuals’ stating 
that the proposed drilling will not negatively impact these rights.”
68
  
The Commonwealth Court, relying upon the trial court’s judgment of the 
credibility of the witnesses, found the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by finding unconventional oil and gas development compatible with the 
purpose of the Rural Resource District. The industrial impact of a well pad 
occurs during the development and construction of the well pad. That 
industrial impact curtails once the wells are producing. Because any 
industrial type impacts are short-lived and relate to development and 
construction, the use of the land is not incompatible.
69
  
A second notable piece of the decision relates to the ERA. Protect PT 
argued that the Ordinance and the trial court’s decision fail to protect the 
Township residents’ right to a healthy environment under the ERA.
70
 
Protect PT argued that there is no evidence in the record that the Township 
“actually identified or evaluated the environmental impacts of its decision-
making in creating the MEO District.”
71
 The Commonwealth Court 
disagreed, pointing to a section of the Ordinance that specifically related to 
an unconventional oil and gas developer’s obligation to meet the 
requirements of the ERA.
72
 That sections states in relevant part:
73
  
The applicant shall demonstrate that the drill site operations will 
not violate the citizens of Penn Township's right to clean air and 
pure water as set forth in [Article I, Section 27] of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution (the Environmental Rights 
Amendment). The applicant shall have the burden to 
demonstrate that its operations will not affect the health, safety 
and welfare of the citizens of Penn Township or any other 
potentially affected land owner. 
The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Township considered its 
residents’ rights under the ERA. 
Finally, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the trial court that Protect 
PT failed to carry its burden to prove its substantive validity challenge by 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. (citing Ordinance § 190-641(D)). 
 69. Id. at 1184 (citing Frederick, 196 A.3d at 689 (zoning regulates the use of land and 
not the particulars of development and construction) (emphasis original) (citations and 
quotations omitted)). 
 70. Id. at 1196. 
 71. Id. at 1197. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Ordinance § 190-641(D). 
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showing that the Zoning Ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable and bears 
no substantial relationship to promoting the public health, safety and 
welfare.
74
 The Ordinance provides “an extensive regulatory scheme far 
beyond that imposed on any other use” to protect the general public.
75
 The 
Court determined that the Ordinance properly balances the rights of the 
citizens to benefit from unconventional oil and gas development (which is 
historically rooted in the community) with the interests of the general 
public.
76
 Relying upon its recent decisions in Frederick and Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network (Middlesex), the Commonwealth Court upheld the 
Ordinance. 
2. Snyder Bros., Inc. v.  Pa. Public Utilities Comm’n., No. 1043 CD 
2015, 2020 WL 587012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2020) 
● Exploration and production company not liable for penalties and 
fines assessed for non-payment of impact fees after challenging 
the assessment of those fees 
In an unreported panel decision, the Commonwealth Court held that 
Snyder Brothers, Inc. was not liable for fees and penalties assessed by the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PA PUC”) for Snyder Brothers’ 
failure to pay certain impact fees on natural gas production.
77
 
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act, commonly known as “Act 13,” requires oil 
and gas producers to pay impact fees based on yearly production.
78
 Snyder 
Brothers challenged to the imposition of impact fees on forty-five 
conventional wells producing less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day 
during any month of the calendar year.
79
 Snyder Brothers argued that wells 
falling below that threshold were “stripper wells” outside the scope of the 
impact fee.  
Snyder Brothers challenged the impact fees before the PA PUC. The PA 
PUC held that Snyder Brothers had to pay fees on those wells it considered 
“stripper wells.” Snyder Brothers appealed the PA PUC and won the impact 
fee challenge before the Commonwealth Court. The case went up to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which interpreted the definition of stripper 
                                                                                                             
 74. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1199. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n., No. 1043 CD 2015, 2020 WL 587012 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2020). 
 78. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. ch. 23. 
 79. Snyder Bros., Inc., 2020 WL 587012, at *1. 
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well differently and reversed the Commonwealth Court.
80
 The Supreme 
Court remanded all issues remaining from the PA PUC adjudication back to 
the Commonwealth Court.  
The Commonwealth Court, on remand, considered whether Snyder 
Brothers was required to pay fines and penalties on the impact fees that it 
challenged.
81
 The Commonwealth Court held that Synder Brothers was not 
required to pay those fines and penalties assessed during its good faith 
challenge because Snyder Brothers lacked a method to challenge the 




There is no mechanism in Act 13 whereby [Snyder Brothers] 
could have paid under protect the amount of any impact or spud 
fees that it disputed. Similarly, Act 13 contains no mechanism by 
which the [PA PUC] could refund any impact or spud fees that 
were paid and disbursed to a municipality, but thereafter 
determined not to be due and owing or otherwise to have been 
erroneously paid. 
Snyder Brothers had to wait until it was under an enforcement action to 
argue its case against the imposition of the fees.  
The Court concluded that Act 13 lacked a meaningful hearing or 
opportunity to adequately protect property interests against unreasonable 
deprivation.
83
 Act 13 does not provide an opportunity to obtain a clear and 
certain remedy in the event of a successful challenge to the imposition of 
impact fees.
84
 There is no refund. “Under the federal constitution, and 
necessarily the charter of this Commonwealth, the ability of a producer to 
obtain an actual and complete remedy is indispensable to meet due process 
concerns.”
85
 The Court continued, “[b]y employing a procedure that 
deprives [Snyder Brothers] of its property without affording [Snyder 
Brothers] the opportunity to meaningfully challenge that deprivation and 
attain full relief, Act 13 effectuates a violation of [Snyder Brothers]’s due 




                                                                                                             
 80. See Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2018). 
 81. Id. at *2. 
 82. Id. at *4. 
 83. Id. at *5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *6. 
 86. Id.  
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Additionally, the Court held that PA PUC’s imposition of fees and 
penalties amounted to a due process violation because Snyder Brothers did 
not have adequate notice of the sanctions.
87
 Snyder Brothers argued, and the 
Court agreed, that PA PUC gave inconsistent advice at the outset of the 
appeal regarding the possibility of any sanction.
88
 Snyder Brothers claimed 
it was “sanctioned for actually following the precise appeal procedures 
recommended” by PA PUC.
89
  
The Commonwealth Court began with the premise that “the requirement 
of clear and adequate notice is not satisfied where the administrative agency 
offers baffling and inconsistent advice, and due process prohibits a person 
from being penalized for acting in conformance with prior agency 
guidance.”
90
 The Court continued:
91
 
Put simply, the Commission provided SBI with “baffling and 
inconsistent” advice and made affirmative representations. In 
essence, the Commission punished SBI when it acted in 
conformity—or at least substantially complied—with the advice 
and guidance that it provided to the public and entities regulated 
under Act 13. . . . [B]ased on the ambiguities in Act 13, SBI, 
under a reasonable person standard, could not identify with 
ascertainable certainty, whether or not, or in what circumstances, 
it could challenge the impact fee statements without facing the 
threat of interest and a penalty. 
As such, the company had no due process right to challenge the validity of 
the assessment or seek a refund for the disputed amounts. Furthermore, 
because Snyder Brothers did not have adequate notice of the possible 
sanctions it faced for not paying the impact fees, it amounted to an 
unconstitutional deprivation of due process. The Commonwealth Court held 
that Snyder Brothers was not required to pay the penalties. 
  
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at *9. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *10 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 91. Id. at *13. 
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E. Third Circuit Court of Appeals  
1. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 
F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 2020) 
● Expert opinion that property value decreased due to “stigma” of 
the presence of a natural gas pipeline must be adhere to the 
reliability standards set forth in Daubert 
A panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously vacated 
awards of just compensation under the Natural Gas Act holding that the 
district court abused its discretion by accepting an expert’s opinion that the 
stigma of a natural gas pipeline decreased the value of the property under 
which the pipeline crossed.
92
 The appeals arose from a natural gas pipeline 
condemnation action commenced in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania. UGI Sunbury, LLC (“UGI”), sought to 
condemn easements for a natural gas pipeline facility. The district court 
granted UGI the right to condemn the easements and then held non-jury 
trials to determine the just compensation owed to the landowners.
93
  
Both UGI and the owners of the affected tracts of land submitted 
evidence of the value of the property. The common measure of 
compensation for a partial taking—such as the condemnation of an 
easement—is the difference in the value of the tract burdened by the 
easement before the taking and after the taking.
94
 In other words, the court 
will award any diminution of value to the affected tract as a result of the 
pipeline. The landowners engaged Don Paul Shearer, a real estate appraiser, 
to provide expert opinion testimony of the valuation of the tracts.
95
 Mr. 
Shearer used a “damaged goods” theory to opine that the mere presence of 
the pipeline  negatively impacted the market value due to the stigma 
associated with natural gas pipelines.
96
 UGI moved in limine to exclude  
Mr. Shearer’s testimony for failure to meet the standards required by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
97
 The district court relied upon Mr. Shearer’s 
testimony to the decreased value due to the stigma of the pipeline and 
awarded just compensation based in-part on that testimony. 
                                                                                                             
 92. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 F.3d 825 (3d 
Cir. 2020). 
 93. Id. at 829-30.  
 94. 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 702(a); see Rover Pipeline LLC v. Rover Tract No. PA-WA-HL-
004.500T, No. 19-1613, --- Fed.Appx. ---, 2020 WL 2214132 (3d Cir. May 7, 2020). 
 95. UGI Sunbury LLC, 949 F.3d at 829. 
 96. Id. at 830. 
 97. Id. 
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UGI appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing that the “damaged goods” 
theory and stigma damages were improper. Applying Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), the Third Circuit held that the expert’s opinion was unreliable, 
lacked “fit” and would not assist the trier of fact.
98
 Mr. Shearer largely 





Under his “damaged goods” theory, Mr. Shearer opined that property a 
pipeline crosses under has a lower value because people perceive it as 
damaged.  Applying the factors of reliability, the panel held that the 
expert’s methodology was incapable of testing, had not been peer reviewed, 
was not generally accepted, and did not provide for a rate of error.  Under 
its precedent, an expert’s opinion does not have to meet all, or even most, 
of those factors. The fact that this expert’s opinion met none, left his 
opinion unreliable.
100
 Notably, the expert agreed that his report contained 
elements of subjectivity and speculation.
101
   
The Third Circuit also held that the expert opinion did not “fit” and 
could not assist the trier of fact.
102
 The Third Circuit noted that some parts 
of the expert’s opinion compared the value of properties impacted by oil 
spills and radiation emitted from the Three-Mile Island nuclear disaster.
103
 
Those properties were distinguishable from the subject properties and 
incapable of assisting the trier of fact in concluding the impact to the value 
of property under which a natural gas pipeline crosses. Mr. Shearer’s 
testimony simply did not fit the action. 
Finally, the Third Circuit held that Rule 702 applies to bench trials in the 
same way that it applies to jury trials.
104
  The district court must act as 
“gatekeeper” and ensure that expert opinions are based on reliable science. 
The Third Circuit did provide that district courts have “leeway” to decide 
how to analyze an opinion under Rule 702, such as conditionally hearing 
the testimony. The opinion demonstrates, however, that even with leeway, 
the district courts must analyze the reliability and fit of the proffered 
expert’s testimony. 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 836. 
 99. Id. at 834. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 831, 835. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 831, 836. 
 104. Id. at 832. 
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F. Federal District Court  
1. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342 
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020) 
● The district court granted defendant oil and gas lessee’s motion 
to dismiss lessor’s claim for breach of the implied covenant to 
develop an oil and gas lease for failing to drill additional unit 
wells while denying motion as to additional claims based on an 
implied duty to market gas. 
Plaintiff landowners, Robert W. Diehl, Jr., and Melanie L. Diehl, 
executed an oil and gas lease in 2007 on 160.94 acres in Susquehanna 
County.  Before the end of the extended primary term in 2017, lessee-
assignee SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”) unitized the lease into 
two units, each with one unconventional gas well producing from the 
Marcellus Shale formation.
105
   
The Diehls filed a claim against SWN in federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction with multiple counts relating to alleged breaches of the implied 
covenant to market and the implied covenant to develop the lease.  SWN 
filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims for failing to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).
106
   
The district court first considered the first three counts related to the 
implied duty to market.  The district court noted that prior federal cases in 
Pennsylvania had recognized this duty, although the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had not recognized an implied duty to market.
107
 In particular, prior 
cases relied upon Texas cases to conclude that where the lease is silent, the 
lessee has a duty to market the oil and gas reasonably, and in a proceeds 
lease, a lessee has a duty to obtain the best price reasonably available.
108
  
The district court cited Texas law to conclude that “the duty to reasonably 
market ‘is two-pronged: (1) ‘the lessee must market the production with 
due diligence,’ and (2) must ‘obtain the best price reasonably possible.’”
109
 
                                                                                                             
 105. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342, at *1 (M.D. Pa. 
Apr. 3, 2020). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *3 (citing Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 359 F. Supp. 3d 268, 
278 (M.D. Pa. 2019)). 
 108. Id. at *4 (citing Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc., No. CV 3:16-0085, 
2017 WL 1078184 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017)). 
 109. Id. (quoting Flanagan v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-0222-B, 2015 WL 
6736648, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2015)). 
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The first count of the Diehl’s complaint alleged that SWN violated the 
implied covenant to market by selling gas for less than the best price 
reasonably available. The district court refused to dismiss the claim, finding 
that the Diehls alleged that SWN had provided insufficient information 
regarding its downstream gas sales, while acknowledging that the Diehls 
would eventually need to provide evidence where SWN could have 
obtained a higher price.
110
  The second count and third count alleged that 
SWN violated the implied covenant by selling the gas to an affiliate and by 
incurring unreasonably high post-production costs.  The district court 
denied SWN’s motion to dismiss these claims as well as related declaratory 
judgment and quiet title claims (Counts V and VI).
111
   
The fourth count alleged that SWN violated the implied covenant to 
develop the lease by drilling additional wells.
112
 In Jacobs v. CNG 
Transmission Corp., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the 
implied covenant to develop that requires a lessee to produce oil and gas 
when a lease does not provide any compensation to the lessor other than 
royalty from production.
113
 SWN argued that the implied covenant did not 
apply because the leases provide  payments in the absence of production, 
including shut-in payments and gas storage rentals. The Diehls argued that 
the covenant still applied because the only compensation currently being 
paid was production royalties.  The district court noted that the Jacobs 
decision did not consider whether the covenant applied to a lease with 
production in paying quantities.
114
 
In Caldwell v. Kriebel Resources Co., the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
dismissed a claim that a lessee violated the implied covenant to develop by 
failing to drill additional wells in the Marcellus Shale formation on a 
leasehold with producing vertical wells.
115
 The district court noted that the 




                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at *5. 
 111. Id. at *6-7, 16. 
 112. Id. at *7. 
 113. Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 565 Pa. 228 (2001). 
 114. Diehl, 2020 WL 1663342, at *9. 
 115. Caldwell v. Kriebel Res. Co., LLC, 72 A.3d 611, 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). 
 116. Diehl, 2020 WL 1663342, at *11 (citing Norm's, Ltd. v. Atlas Noble, LLC, No. 1377 
WDA 2014, 2015 WL 7112968 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 8, 2015) (“To the extent that Norm's is 
arguing Atlas has a duty to completely develop and extract all exploitable resources on the 
leased premises, there is no provision of the Lease that imposes such a duty and we will not 
imply it for the above reasons.”)). 
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In Seneca Resources Corp. v. S&T Bank, the Superior Court affirmed 
summary judgment against an oil and gas lessor who claimed that the lessee 
violated the implied covenant to develop all of the acreage covered by a 
very high acreage lease. The Superior Court concluded that because the 
lease did not contain a drilling commitment beyond the habendum clause 
requirement of production in paying quantities, the express language of the 
lease foreclosed the application of the implied covenant of development.
117
  
The district court concluded that the “Superior Court has consistently 
concluded that an implied duty to develop was not applicable or was not 
breached when the lessor was not holding the property without developing 
it—where development had commenced it was the express terms of the 
lease that controlled.”
118
 The Diehls failed to distinguish the cases or cite 
contrary authority and the court further concluded that “during the 
production phase of operations, absent express development terms in the 
lease, the terms of the habendum clause represent the only bargain of the 
parties and no implied duty to develop reasonably can be imposed upon the 
lessee thereafter.”
119
 Because SWN produced from two producing wells, 
SWN did not hold the lease without payment and the lease did not impose 
any additional requirements.
120
   
The district court further rejected the Diehls’ alternative claim that they 
had sufficiently alleged that SWN was not acting in good faith.  SWN could 
rely on its business judgment unless the Diehls could provide additional 
facts supporting a claim of fraud by SWN.
121
 The district court dismissed 
Count IV of the Diehls’ complaint. 
  
                                                                                                             
 117. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342, at *12 (M.D. 
Pa. Apr. 3, 2020) (quoting Seneca Res. Corp. v. S & T Bank, 122 A.3d 374, 387 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2015) (“Thus, as the parties have stipulated that the drilling and operating requirements 
under the Lease are satisfied, the Lease will extend for an indefinite secondary term as long 
as any portion of the leased premises are being drilled or operated for the production of oil 
or gas.  Indeed, as noted in the above discussion regarding severability, the Lease makes no 
mention of any duty or mandate to drill or operate the unoperated acreage for the production 
of gas to continue the Lease as to that acreage in full force and effect. Based upon the 
foregoing, we conclude that the Lease between the Appellants and Seneca forecloses a 
finding of a breach of the implied covenant to develop and produce oil and gas on the 
unoperated acreage.”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 118. Id. at *12. 
 119. Id.at *14. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *16 (citing Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 241 (1899)). 
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2. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2020 WL 1503657 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020) 
● The district court denied oil and gas lessee’s motion for 
summary judgment on lessor claims that leases had terminated 
under habendum clauses, finding that lessors raised an issue of 
fact as to lessee’s due diligence under operations clauses 
Plaintiffs Gary R. Butters, Co-Trustee of the Butters Clinton County Gas 
Protector Trust, David F. Butters, Terry L. Butters, and Glen E. Butters 
(collectively, “Butters”) executed two oil and gas leases in 2005 that were  
assigned to SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”), covering multiple 
tracts in Tioga County, Pennsylvania.
122
 The leases had five year primary 
terms that could be extended for an additional five years, and lessee 
extended the terms until 2015.  The habendum clauses in the leases 
provided in part that the leases would be extended beyond the primary term: 
as long thereafter as (1) drilling operations continue with due 
diligence, provided that LESSEE has commenced drilling 
operations on any portion of the premises or any lands pooled or 
unitized therewith, within the primary term.
123
 
The leases defined “operations” as follows: 
Operations. Whenever used in this lease, the word “operations” 
(unless specified to the contrary) shall mean operations for and 
any of the following: dirt work, building of roads and locations, 
drilling, testing, completing, reworking, recompleting, 
deepening, plugging back, repairing, abandoning or dewatering 
(meaning pumping or flowing of water and/or associated 
hydrocarbons from a well) of a well in search of or in an 
endeavor to obtain, increase or restore and/or market or render 
marketable or more valuable production of oil or gas, and/or 
production, actual or constructive, of oil or gas.
124
 
SWN’s predecessor drilled a well lateral in 2011, but the well was not 
connected to a pipeline due to a lack of availability. In 2015, SWN began 
implementing a “Continuous Operations Schedule” on a wellpad on the unit 
containing the leases and drilled one additional lateral, but it also was not 
                                                                                                             
 122. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2020 WL 1503657, at *1 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 30, 2020). 
 123. Id. at *2. 
 124. Id. 
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  Under the Schedule, SWN allegedly performed 
operations on the wells every 60 to 90 days to ensure that SWN met the 
requirement of “due diligence” under the continuous operations clause. 
The Butters brought an action to have the leases terminated in state court. 
SWN removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds.
126
 After the 
district court denied SWN’s motion to dismiss, SWN later brought a motion 
for summary judgment, arguing that there is no issue of material fact as to 
whether SWN met its contractual obligation to continue operations with due 
diligence.  The district court adopted this general test for due diligence: 
“[t]he diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a 




The Butters argued SWN’s adoption of the Continuous Operations 
Schedule was evidence of a lack of due diligence. Further,  SWN argued 
that it was sufficient evidence of due diligence.
128
 The district court found 
that the adoption of the Schedule was not per se evidence of due diligence 
or evidence of a lack of due diligence.
129
 SWN also argued that its 
completion of the second well demonstrated due diligence, but the district 
court distinguished the cases cited by SWN as involving whether a lessee 
had commenced operations on a lease prior to the end of the primary term, 
rather than addressing proper due diligence in the secondary term.
130
 The 
district court also found that the parties disputed whether SWN had 
complied with the 60 to 90 day schedule. The Butters alleged a six-month 
period without operations and argued that SWN’s actions were indicative of 
bad faith.  The district court credited the Butter’s argument that SWN took 
longer to complete the well than other operators but also credited SWN’s 
argument that the unavailability of a pipeline should also bear on the 
reasonableness of any delays, while not ipso facto excusing any delays.
131
 
The district court denied SWN’s motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that SWN’s due diligence was an issue for the factfinder at trial.
132
  
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at *3. 
 126. Id. at *5. 
 127. Id. at *8 (quoting Diligence, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). 
 128. Id. at *9. 
 129. Id. at *10. 
 130. Id. (distinguishing Roe v. Chief Expl. & Dev. LLC, No. 4:11-CV-00579, 2013 WL 
4083326 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013), and Pemco Gas, Inc. v. Bernardi, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 85 
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1977)). 
 131. Id. at *11. 
 132. Id. at *11. 
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3. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., No. 
1:12-CV-1567, -- F.Supp.F.3d --, 2020 WL 1922628 (M.D. Pa. April 21, 
2020) 
● On motion for reconsideration, the district court denied partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, holding that genuine issue of fact existed as to 
whether tax sale purchaser was agent of owner, precluding a 
“title wash” of severed mineral interest held by predecessor of 
defendants.  
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a complaint against two trusts 
holding the interests of Thomas Proctor’s heirs (collectively, “Proctor 
Heirs”) claiming ownership of surface and oil and gas rights under 
numerous tracts in Sullivan and Bradford Counties.
133
  The parties 
eventually brought cross-motions for partial summary judgment.  The Chief 
Magistrate issued a report recommending that both motions be denied.  
Both parties filed objections with the district court.   
The motions specifically addressed ownership of the Josiah Haines 
Warrant located in LeRoy Township, Bradford County, the Bellwether tract 
for the litigation. Thomas Proctor and Jonathan A. Hill first conveyed the 
tract in 1894 to the Union Tanning Company, excepting the oil, gas and 
minerals.  In 1903, Union Tanning Company conveyed the property to the 
Central Pennsylvania Lumber Company (“CPLC”), excepting certain bark 
rights on the timber and subject to prior reservations.  In 1908, Calvin H. 
McCauley purchased the property at a tax sale in 1907.  The dispute 
centered on which rights were conveyed in the tax sale deed.
134
  
In 1910, McCauley and his wife quitclaimed their interest in numerous 
warrants, including the Josiah Haines Warrant, back to the CPLC.  In 1920, 
the CPLC conveyed the Warrant to the Pennsylvania Game Commission, 
expressly subject to the exceptions in the 1894 and 1903 deeds.  After 1980, 
the Proctor Heirs leased the Warrant for oil and gas development.
135
  
 The parties filed objections relating to four disputes that the 
Magistrate Report identified as having a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding summary judgment: 1) whether the Warrant was seated or 
unseated (meaning developed or undeveloped) at the time of the 1907 tax 
                                                                                                             
 133. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., No. 1:12-CV-1567, -- 
F.Supp.F.3d --, 2020 WL 1922628 (M.D. Pa. April 21, 2020). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at *2. 
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assessment; 2) whether McCauley acted as an agent for the Central 
Pennsylvania Lumber Company when he purchased the Warrant in 1908; 3) 
whether the terms of the 1920 deed to the Game Commission prevented the 
conveyance of the oil, gas and mineral rights, and 4) whether the 1908 tax 
sale met federal due process requirements.
136
   
 The Game Commission’s ownership claim relied upon the theory that 
the 1908 tax sale “title-washed” the severed minerals under the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Herder Spring Hunting Club v. 
Keller.
137
 Title-washing in that decision only applies to “unseated,” 
undeveloped land. The County land assessor designated the land as seated 
or unseated based on an investigation of the property for permanent 
improvements indicating that the land was seated.  The Proctor Heirs 
introduced evidence that bark-peeling (the bark was used by leather 
tanneries) and lumbering activities took place on the warrant in 1905, 1906, 
and 1907.
138
 The bark was removed by cutting down the tree, striping off 
the bark, and leaving the wood to rot.  The district court concluded that a 
reasonable juror could decide that the property should have been designated 
as seated based on this activity.
139
  
  However, the district court found that the Proctor Heirs could not use 
this to attack the validity of the 1908 tax deed. The Act of June 3, 1885, 
which controlled the tax sales, provided that “[a]ll sales of seated or 
unseated lands within this commonwealth which shall hereafter be made for 
arrearages of taxes due thereon, shall be held, deemed and taken to be valid 
and effective irrespective of the fact whether such lands were seated or 
unseated at the time of the assessment of such taxes.”
140
   The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court ruled that “[The Act of June 3, 1885] made an important 
change in the law by validating sales which followed the assessment and it 
furnished some protection to purchasers at tax sales by foreclosing litigation 
as to whether the assessor had erred in determining whether the land was 




                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 636 Pa. 344 (2016). 
 138. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 2020 WL 1922628 at *3-4. 
 139. Id. at *4. 
 140. Id. at 5 (quoting 72 P. S. § 5933). 
 141. Scott v. Bell, 344 Pa. 243, 245–46 (1942) (quoting Pittsburg Hunting Club v. 
Snyder, 51 Pa. Super. 174, 182 (1912)) (emphasis added). 
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The district court rejected a Third Circuit case cited by the Proctor 
Heirs,
142
 noting that the case failed to cite prior Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decisions on the issue and misconstrued an exception in the statute. 
Scott implies that the exception in the section only invalidated a tax sale  as 
seated or unseated when it conflicted with the underlying assessment as to 
whether the property was seated or unseated, not the correctness of the 
underlying assessment itself.
143
 The district court also cited the legislative 
history of the Act to support the conclusion that the Act was intended to 
stop challenges to the underlying assessment of land as seated or 
unseated.
144
 Accordingly, the Proctor Heirs could not challenge the validity 
of the assessment as unseated.
145
 
 The second dispute involved whether McCauley was an agent for the 
CLPC when he purchased the Josiah Haines Warrant at the 1908 tax sale.
146
  
The Proctor Heirs introduced evidence that McCauley purchased over 100 
properties of CPLC’s at delinquent tax sales and quitclaimed those tracts 
back to CPLC.  McCauley was identified as CPLC’s real estate agent in its 
articles of incorporation and internal documents. McCauley also made 
appearances as an attorney for CPLC in court proceedings.  CPLC even 
paid the taxes on the Warrant after McCauley purchased the Warrant.  The 
district court concluded that there was considerable evidence that 
McCauley was CPLC’s agent.
147
   
 The district court found there was sufficient evidence to raise a 
dispute of material fact as to whether that the interest sold at tax sale only 
embraced the surface of the Warrant, based on the assessment in the name 
of CPLC.  The court distinguished this case from the Herder case because 
in Herder neither party reported their interest to the county commissioners 
subsequent to the severance of the Warrant.
148
  
                                                                                                             
 142. Northumberland City. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 131 F.2d 562 
(3d Cir. 1942). 
 143. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 2019 WL 6893205 at *6 (“Scott implies that the 
exception operated to invalidate tax sales in the rare situation where land was regularly 
assessed as seated or unseated but then sold at a tax sale as the opposite, failing to ‘follow’ 
its assessment.”).  
 144. Id. at *8-9 (citing LEGIS. REC., S. 110th Assy., 1st Sess., at 2089 (Pa. May 28, 
1885)). 
 145. Id. at *9 (“Even if the Bradford County assessor was mistaken about the character of 
the Josiah Haines warrant in 1907, the Proctor Trusts cannot challenge the validity of the 
treasurer's sale by proffering evidence that the assessor misclassified the tract.”). 
 146. Id. at *10. 
 147. Id. at *11. 
 148. Id. at *12-13 (citing Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 360). 
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The district court cited the principle that a property owner who had a 
duty to pay taxes, cannot acquire a better title by purchasing the property at 
a tax sale for delinquent taxes, citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decision in Powell v. Lanzy.
149
  Again distinguishing Herder, the district 
court concluded that CPLC had a duty to pay taxes on the Warrant:  
We acknowledge that, at several points in the Herder 
Spring decision, the court uses language—albeit in dicta—which 
could be read to infer that there was no duty to pay taxes on 
unseated land. Nevertheless, when put in proper context, we do 
not believe that such remarks were meant to contradict 
longstanding legislation or state court precedent.
150
 
The district court concluded that CPLC had a duty to pay the taxes even 
though they did not have personal liability or responsibility to pay the 
taxes.
151
  If McCauley were CPLC’s agent, then under Powell CPLC could 
only be vested with its surface estate.  
On the third dispute, whether the oil and gas rights were reserved in the 
1920 deed from CPLC to the Game Commission, the district court 
concluded that the “subject to” clause was insufficient to reserve the oil, gas 
and mineral rights, finding that this language intended to protect against 
breach of warranty claims.
152
 Lastly, the district court denied the Proctor 
Heirs’ claim that the tax sale law violated due process. The court concluded 
that the process of constructive notice was constitutionally adequate despite 
the use of notice by publication: 
For treasurers’ sales in the 1800s and early 1900s, it was “not 
reasonably ... practicable to give more adequate warning” to 
unseated property owners. Notice by publication was the type of 
notice required, expected, and relied upon at the time, and for 
good reason. Such notice was “reasonably calculated to apprise 
interested” unseated landowners of the pending tax sale and 
“afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  Stated 
differently, notice by publication was “reasonably certain to 
inform those affected.”
153
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The district court found genuine issues of material fact precluding partial 
summary judgment as to 1) the scope of the interest conveyed in the 1908 




G. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board  
1. B&R Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, EHB Docket No. 2015-
095-B, 2020 WL 853729 (Pa.Env.Hrg.Bd. Feb. 14, 2020), appeal 
pending, 291 CD 2020 (PA. Commw. Ct.) 
● Enforcement against individual under participation theory 
extends only to those violations the company could have 
addressed.  
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Environmental Hearing Board 
applied the participation theory to find individual liability on a plugging 
order issued by the Department of Environmental Protection.
155
 Under its 
previous adjudication in 2017, the Board found Richard Campola, the sole 
member of B&R Resources, LLC, personally liable on all forty-seven wells 
subject to the plugging order (the “Wells”).
156
 The Board held Mr. Campola 
liable under a participation theory of personal liability.
157
 After an appeal to 
the Commonwealth Court and subsequent remand, the Board concluded 
that Mr. Campola was personally liable for four of the Wells because the 
company only had the resources to address four of the forty-seven 
violations.  
Generally, the liabilities of a business entity, like B&R Resources, do not 
extend to the individual corporate officers, directors or shareholders of the 
corporation, such as Mr. Campola.
158
 The participation theory is an 
exception to that general rule. Under the participation theory, an officer, 
director or shareholder can be held individually liable for personally 
participating in the wrongful conduct.
159
 Here, B&R Resources owned and 
operated the Wells. The Department issued an order to both B&R 
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 155. B&R Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, EHB Docket No. 2015-095-B, 
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Resources and Mr. Campola. The Department argued that Mr. Campola 
was individually liable because he personally participated in the 
abandonment of the Wells by failing to address the violations.  
Mr. Campola appealed the 2017 adjudication and the Commonwealth 
Court reversed and remanded the issue back to the Board.
160
 The 
Commonwealth Court concluded that personal liability could only extend to 
the violations that the company could have addressed.
161
 As such, the 
Commonwealth Court remanded back to the Board to determine “how 
many, if any, of the Wells could have been plugged if Campola had caused 
B&R to make reasonable efforts to plug the Wells[.]”
162
 
On remand, the Board analyzed B&R Resources’ financial records and 
heard expert opinion testimony submitted by both parties. The Board 
concluded that B&R Resources could have used approximately $85,278 to 
address the violations noted in the plugging order.
163
 The Board then 
divided that number by $18,500, to calculate the average cost to plug one of 
the forty-seven Wells.
164
 After conducting its analysis, the Board found Mr. 
Campola personally liable on the plugging obligations for four of the forty-
seven Wells.
165
 The Board’s application demonstrates that it must 
determine whether the company responsible for compliance can address the 
violations before finding personal liability of the company’s officers, 
directors or shareholders. 
H. Regulatory Changes 
Pennsylvania Regulatory Agency Increases Unconventional Well 
Permitting Fees 150% 
The fees necessary to obtain an unconventional well permit increased on 
August 1, 2020.
166
 The Independent Regulatory Review Commission 
(“IRRC”) approved a final rulemaking that increased the unconventional 
well permit fee from $5,000 for non-vertical unconventional wells and 
$4,200 for vertical unconventional wells to $12,500 for all unconventional 
wells after the Environmental Quality Board approved the rulemaking 
package on January 21, 2020. Conventional well permitting fees did not 
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change under the rulemaking. The fee increases became  effective upon 
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